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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
:
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPENING BRIEF
OF APPELLANT

v,
DARRYL HUBBARD,
:

Case No. 20000233-SC
Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction for a first degree or
capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant the use of an

expert witness to assist the jury in understanding the eyewitness identification testimony.
Standard of Review: "The admission or exclusion of evidence is for
the trial court to determine as an initial matter, and its judgment will be
overturned only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Finlayson 956
P.2d283,291 (UtahApp. 1998), quoting State v. Miller 727 P.2d203,
205 (Utah, 1986).
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This issue was preserved for appeal by way of Appellant's Notice of Intent to Rely
on Expert Testimony filed with the Third District Judicial Court August 16, 1999, which
included the curriculum vitae of Hubbard's proposed expert witness, Dr. David H. Dodd.
(R. 64-71) Appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification on August 31, 1999. (R. 82-94) A hearing was
held on the matter before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder on September 2, 1999. (R. 240)
Judge Hilder entered an Order denying Defendant's Motion on September 28, 1999. (R.
132-135)(See Addendum B)
II.

Whether the introduction of the eyewitness identification violated Appellant's right

to due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Standard of Review: The court on appeal reviews the factual
findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard.
It reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on the facts
under a correctness standard. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851
(Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991)).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Appellant's filing of his Motion to
Suppress Eyewitness Identification on June 2, 1999 in the Third Judicial District Court.
(R. 43-45) A hearing on the Motion was held July 9, 1999 before the Honorable Judge
Robert K. Hilder. (R. 228) The Judge entered an Order denying Hubbard's Motion on
August 16, 1999. (R. 62)
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III.

Whether the trial court erred by conducting individual voir dire of prospective

jurors at side bar, outside the defendant's presence and off the record.
Standard of Review: Appellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).
Although this issue was not raised before the trial court, this Court should consider
this issue on appeal because the trial court committed plain error. State v. Harrison,
P.3d

, (slip opinion at paragraph 15) (Utah, 2001). See also. State v. Dunn,

850 P.2d, 1201, 108-09 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules and regulations are contained in Addendum A.
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV
Utah State Const. Art. I, Section 7
Utah State Const. Art. I, Section 12
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1953)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On February 18, 1999, Appellant was charged by Information with Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1994);
-3-

Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203
(1989); Aggravated Assault (relating to Jeff Gunderson), a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); Theft, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973); Possession of a Dangerous Weapon By a
Restricted Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10503(2)(a) (1997); and Aggravated Assault (relating to Cheryl Moss), a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). (R. 22-25)
At a preliminary hearing held May 11, 1999, the trial court found that the State
did not produce evidence to a probable cause standard sufficient to bind Appellant over
on the charges of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and the third
degree felony Aggravated Assault, (relating to Cheryl Moss). (R. 227 at 63) Appellant
was bound over on the remaining counts. (Id.)
An evidentiary hearing on Appellant's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness
Identification Testimony was held July 9, 1999. (R. 228) At the hearing, Detective Karl
Merino testified as to the procedures he followed in presenting the photo lineup to
witnesses Gunderson and Moss. (R. 228 at 5-51) Appellant argued that the photo lineup
was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable. (R. 228 at 53-54) The trial court denied
Appellant's motion, finding that the photo lineup was reliable and not impermissibly
suggestive. (R. 228 at 57)
A hearing on Appellant's Motion to Allow Eyewitness Expert Testimony was held
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September 2, 1999. (R. 240) Appellant argued that the court should allow the expert
testimony of Dr. David Dodd regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification
testimony. (R. 240 at 4-17) The trial court denied Appellant's motion, finding that such
testimony was neither required nor advisable. (R. 132-135) Specifically, the court found
that education of the jury was a judicial function, best accomplished by instruction rather
than by an expert. (Id.) In addition, the court found that allowing an expert witness to
testify on the subject of the reliability of eyewitness testimony wold tend to cause the jury
to abdicate its role as fact finder. (Id.)
A jury trial was held January 18-19, 2000. (R. 229-230). The jury convicted
Appellant of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1994), Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-203 (1989), and Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). (R. 191-194, 230 at 276)
Appellant was sentenced March 6, 2000 to an indeterminate term of five years to
life on the two first degree felonies and an indeterminate term of zero to five years on the
third degree felony, all charges to run concurrent. (R. 199-201)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of January 24, 1999, Jeff Gunderson ("Gunderson") and a few
friends were at his apartment smoking marijuana when Gunderson answered a knock at
his door by someone identifying himself as "Six Nine." (R. 229 at 129, 131) When
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Gunderson attempted to stop the person from entering his apartment, the person shot
Gunderson in the leg. (R. 229 at 132) The person then entered Gunderson's apartment,
pointed the gun at Gunderson, and demanded drugs, money and guns from the two safes
located inside the apartment. (R. 229 at 133)
Gunderson opened the first safe and the person took the small amount of money
and marijuana stashed inside of it. (R. 229 at 138) The person also took a larger amount
of money from Gunderson's wallet as well as his pistol grip Mossberg shotgun. (R. 229 at
137-38) The person then took Gunderson back to the bedroom to open the second safe.
(R. 229 at 139) The person instructed Gunderson to wait in the bedroom. (Id.) Without
taking anything from the second safe, the person then fled from the apartment. (Id.)
Also present in the apartment during the robbery were Gunderson's live-in
girlfriend, Cheryl Moss, ("Moss") and three of Gunderson's male friends: Travis Pearson,
Michael Martin, and Ayza Wells. (R. 229 at 80, R. 227 at 21-22)
Gunderson gave a description of the assailant to an officer arriving at his
residence approximately one-half hour following the robbery. (R. 227 at 28-29R. 229 at
141) Gunderson may have also given a description of the assailant to detectives who
spoke with him while he was recovering in the hospital. (R. 227 at 29) Gunderson's
described the assailant as being "very tall" (R. 227 at 29), "approximately six foot nine, if
not larger." (R. 227 at 14); as a black male with a medium to light complexion (R. 227 at
29); strong (R. 227 at 30); having a goatee (Id-); wearing a baggy dark coat and a black
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or dark blue "beanie" stocking cap rolled down to approximately one inch above his
eyebrow, and calling himself "Six Nine." (R. 227 at 30-31).
Moss gave her first description of the assailant to the police when they responded
to the residence she shared with Gunderson. (R. 227 at 47) Moss gave another description
of the assailant to an officer later in the evening at LDS hospital where Gunderson was
being treated for his wound. (R. 227 at 48) She described the assailant as wearing a green
and black Nike jacket, Levi's, and a black ski cap. (Id.) Moss returned to the apartment
that evening to obtain some clothing. (R. 229 at 96, R. 227 at 46) While there, the
upstairs neighbors came downstairs to talk with her. (Id.) They informed her that they
knew and "hung out" with a person who went by the nickname "Six Nine." (R. 229 at 97)
Moss contacted Detective Karl Merino ("Merino"), the detective assigned to investigate
the robbery, and gave him this information. (R. 229 at 97)
After receiving the information that the suspect went by the nickname of "Six
Nine", Merino contacted the Salt Lake County Sheriffs department and asked them if
they knew of anyone who used that nickname. (R. 228 at 10; R. 229 at 166) The
Sheriffs department then supplied Merino with a photograph, a mug shot, of Appellant.
(Id.) Believing that the mug shot matched the description of the assailant given to him by
Gunderson, Merino assembled a photo lineup. (R. 228 at 11; R. 229 at 168) Merino went
to Gunderson's house on February 15, 1999, to show him the photo lineup. (R. 229 at
164) Gunderson, Moss and another individual met Merino in the back parking area
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belonging to their apartment. (R. 229 at 168) Merino first showed the photo array to
Gunderson, and Gunderson identified Appellant as the perpetrator. (R. 229 at 143-144,
170) Moss said she was standing about ten feet from Gunderson during this time. (R. 229
at 99) Moss heard Gunderson say "That's him," and T m ten on the scale," when Merino
showed Gunderson the photos. (Id.) Merino then gave the photos to Moss to review. (R.
229 at 171). Merino stated that Moss was forty or fifty feet away when he had conducted
the photo line up with Gunderson. (R. 228 at 19, R. 229 at 173) Moss also picked
Appellant as the perpetrator. (R. 229 at 98, 171)
Following these identifications, the State of Utah filed an Information charging
Appellant with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1994); Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-203 (1989); Aggravated Assault (relating to Jeff Gunderson), a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); Theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973); Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon By a Restricted Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-503(2)(a) (1997); and Aggravated Assault (relating to Cheryl Moss), a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). (R. 22-25).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant's only available defense at trial centered on the question of the identity
of the robber. The State presented no other evidence linking Appellant to the crimes.
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Additionally, Appellant presented an alibi defense. In order to educate the jury on th§
inherent dangers and fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony, Appellant asked
the trial court to allow expert testimony on the matter. The trial court denied Appellant's
request, violating Appellant's due process rights and his right to present a defense.
The trial court also denied Appellant his rights of due process under both the Utah
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution when it denied his motion to suppress the photo
array identifications and subsequent in-court identifications. The witnesses' identification
of Appellant as the robber were unreliable, and should not have been admitted. Further,
the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, making the subsequent in-court
identifications unreliable and inadmissible.
Appellant has a fundamental right, guaranteed statutorily and constitutionally, [to
be present at every stage of the criminal proceedings against him. This right belongs
solely to the defendant, and may only be waived freely and knowingly. Appellant did not
waive this privilege, yet the trial court engaged in many instances of private discussions
with prospective jurors at the bench, outside Appellant's presence. Such conduct by the
trial court constituted reversible error, requiring this Court to remand these proceedings
for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DESICRETION IN
DENYING APPELLANT THE USE OF AN EXPERT WITNESS TO
ASSIST THE JURY IN UNDERSTANDING THE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.

Appellant filed a M Notice of Intent to Rely on Expert Testimony with the Third
District Judicial Court August 16, 1999, which included the curriculum vitae of
Appellant's proposed expert witness, Dr. David H. Dodd. (R. 64-71) The curriculum
vitae noted that Dr. Dodd, a psychology professor at the University of Utah, specializes in
eyewitness memory, cognition and language and language development. (R. at 66)
Appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification on August 31, 1999. (R. 82-94) Appellant's Memorandum in
support stated that "[t]he expert testimony that defendant seeks to admit to the Court at
trial in this matter pertains to research and theory concerning memory, the reporting of
memory, and the variables known to influence memory and memory reports. (R. at 83)
Additionally, Appellant's Memorandum in Support proffered Dr. Dodd's expected
testimony regarding the unreliability eyewitness identification testimony. (R. at 89-92)
The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Intent to
Rely on Expert Testimony. (R. 74) A hearing was held on the matter before the
Honorable Robert K. Hilder on September 2, 1999. (R. 240) At the hearing, Appellant
requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of Dr. Dodd's
testimony's foundational prinicples and techniques. In the alternative, Appellant argued
that the trial court should admit the testimony under the rigors of State v. Rimmasch. 775
P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) and Utah R. Evid. 702. Following the evidentiary hearing, Judge
Hilder entered an Order denying Appellant's Motion on September 28, 1999. (R. 132 -
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135) Grounds for denial of said motion were as follows:
First, the more complete consideration of the issues in both
Long and
subsequent cases suggest to this court that education of the jury
is a
judicial function, best accomplished through instruction, rather
than one to be delegated to an expert who would, in fact, merely
lecture the jury. Second, the Court is concerned that allowing an
expert witness on the subject of reliabilty of eyewitness
testimony would have a significant tendency to cause the jury
to abdicate its role as fact finder, at least with respect to any
issues that must be decided based on eyewitness testimony.
(R. at 133-134); See Ruling on Appellant's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony regarding
Eyewitness Identification at Addendum B)
The trial court's conclusion that the use of a cautionary instruction is incorrect
since the typical instruction, set forth in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 494 n.8 (Utah 1986)
merely tells the jury things it might consider and that it is not to be considered as
evidence. The use of a cautionary instruction does not fully address the concerns
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification and does not provide a substitute for
expert testimony.
The trial court's conclusion that admitting expert testimony on eyewitness
testimony would have a significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role as finder
of fact is also incorrect. Expert testimony, even expert testimony which embraces an
ultimate issue and is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 704, is admitted without the jury
abdicating its role. See United States v. Langford. 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting)(pointing out that the rationale that expert testimony is
-11-

inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury "has been discredited and rejected
by scholars, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court.")1
Utah R. Evid. 702 and Utah case law provide a basis for admission of expert
testimony regarding eyewitness identification. The trial court abused its discretion in
disallowing Dr. Dodd's testimony.
Utah R. Evid. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It states, "[i]f
scientific, techinical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of
opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702.
A trial court has discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible.
State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah, 1997). That discretion must be exercised,
however, within the framework of the three-part test articulation in State v. Rimmasch,
775 P.2d at 398-400, (Utah, 1989). That test requires the trial court to determine whether:

1

Regarding the rejection of the usurping the jury role rationale, Judge Ferguson
elaborated: Dean Wigmore claimed that the jury function reasoning is a "mere bit of empty
rhetoric." 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence Trials at Common Law Sec 1920, at 18 (J. Chadboum rev. ed.
1978). The Federal Rules of Evidence have eliminated this rationale as a permissible objection
to opinion evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a) ("[Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact."); see also United States v. Rogers. 769
F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court rejected similar arguments in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899, 103
S.Ct. 3383, 3397-98, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)("We are not persuaded that the fact finder and the
adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its
shortcomings"). Langford, 802 F.2d at 1183-84 (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
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(1) "the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are
inherently reliable," (State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996)); (2) "the scientific
principles or techiniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular
case by sufficiently qualified experts," (Id.); and (3) "the proffered scientific evidence
will be more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence." Id. (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8). The last consideration is based on
the requirement of Utah R. Evid. 702 that the evidence assist the trier of fact, or in other
words, that it be helpful. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8.
In its ruling, the trial court failed to explicitly state how Dr. Doddfs proffered
testimony failed to meet the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 702 and Rimmasch. (R. at 132135) As noted above, the trial couifs discretion in determining whether expert testimony
is admissible must be exercised within the framework of Rimmasch's three-part test. State
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah, 1997); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398-400
(Utah, 1989). This Court stated in State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah, 1996) that ".
Rimmasch provides a detailed and rigorous outline for trial courts to follow when|
making determinations concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence." citing
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 ("The trial court should carefully explore each logical link in
the chain that leads to expert testimony given in court and determine its reliability.") Id.
The record in the instant case fails to show whether the trial court followed the approach
dictated by Rimmasch. Rather, a review of the record suggests that the trail court merely

-13-

accepted the State's argument that a cautionary instruction would best educate the jury,
that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification would amount to nothing more
than a lecture to the jury, and that allowing such expert testimony would have a tendency
to cause the jury to abdicate its role of fact finder. (R. 78, 134) The trial court abused its
discretion by failing to conduct an analysis under Rimmasch and Utah R.Evid. 702.
Appellant submits that such an analysis was required by the trial court and further, that his
proposed expert testimony is admissible under Utah case law and the rules.
A.
Expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is admissible under
Rimmasch.
Rimmasch first requires a threshold showing of inherent reliability. This can be
done in two ways: (1) if the proponent can show that the evidence is generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community, the trial court can take judicial notice of its reliability;
or, (2) the proponent must lay an adequate foundation to demonstrate the inherent
reliability of the underlying scientifice principles and techniques. Rimmasch 775 P. 2d at
400; State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337 (Utah,1997) Appellant argued both the above points
in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification (R. 84-85) and at the evidentiary hearing. (R. 240 at 6 -7)
The trial court's order seems to indicate that the testimony Appellant sought to
introduce would meet the threshold showing of inherent reliability. (R. 132- 133,
Addendum C). The Judge wrote, ff[d]efendant appropriately argues that there are some
problems inherent in eyewitness testimony, which view is fully supported by the Utah
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Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1986)." (Id.) The order
stated further, f,[w]hile the Maestas decision, and the arguments of counsel, both alert the
Court to the possibility of allowing eyewitness testimony, this Court does not believe that
such testimony is either required or advisable." (R. 133, Addendum C) The Court then
went on to deny Appellant's motion for the reasons set forth above. (R. 133-134,
Addendum C)
The second part of the Rimmasch test was also met, and the trial court should have
allowed Appellant's requested expert testimony. The record demonstrates that Appellant
supplied adequate foundation for the proposed expert testimony. (See Notice of Intent to
Rely on Expert Testimony which included Dr. Dodd's curriculum vitae, (R. 64-71);
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification (R. 82-94); Hearing on Motion to Allow Eyewitness Identification (R.
240))
The last issue under Rimmasch before the trial court and this Court is whether the
evidence would be helpful, i.e., whether the expert testimony would be more probative
than prejudicial. See Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 n.8.
In order to be "helpful", expert testimony must convey information which is n6t
ordinarily within the knowledge of the average juror. See State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1155,
1361 (Utah, 1993).
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of
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the average individual. Dixon [v. Stewart], 658 P.2d [591] at
597 [(Utah, 1982)]. It is not necessary that the subject matter
be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly
understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a
requirement that the subject be beyond the comprehension of each
and every juror. See id.
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. In other words, "'expert opinion is proper when it would help
to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert
and beyond the ken of the typical juror;

" People v. Brooks. 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697

(N.Y., 1985) (further citations omitted)
In Larsen, this Court held that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony in
a securities fraud case "'because the technical nature of securities is not within the
knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common experience and would
help the jury understand the issues before them.'" Id (further citation omitted) Just as
securities information is not average layman knowledge, correct information regarding
the reliability of testimony is not within the knowledge of the average layman, as
recognized by this Court in State v. Long. 721 P. 2d 483, 490 (Utah, 1986).
Recognizing that jurors do not have accurate and complete information regarding
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have
determined that expert testimony in this area "can provide significant assistance to the
jury beyond that obtained through cross-examination and common sense." State v.
Taylor. 749 P.2d 181, 184 (Wash. App. 1988) (citing inter alia United States v. Moors.
786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985);
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United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208
(Ariz. 1983); People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516 (Cal. 1985)(rev'd on other grounds, 107
S.Ct. 837 (1987)); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); Brooks, 490 N.Y.S.2d
692; State v. Buell 489 N.E. 2d 795 (Ohio 1986)
California courts have fashioned a test for determining whether a trial court abused
its discretion in excluding expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness
identifications:
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key
element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially
corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and
the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific
psychological factors shown by the record that could have
affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to
be fully known or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be
error to exclude that testimony.
McDonald, 690 P.2d at 727.
Washington courts also apply a similar test under which an abuse of discretion in
excluding expert testimony occurs, "(1) where the identification of the defendant is the
principal issue at trial; (2) the defendant presents an alibi defense; and (3) there is little or
no other evidence linking the defendant to the crime." State v. Taylor, 749 P.2d 181, 184
(Wash. App. 1988).
In the present case, expert testimony would be "helpful" to the jury since
identification is the central issue, there is no other evidence linking Appellant to the
crime, the expert testimony related to factors which would have affected the accuracy of
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the identification, and Appellant presented an alibi defense.
Despite this Court's decisions in State v. Long.721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), State v.
Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999) and State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),
recognizing the fallibility of identification testimony and factors affecting the reliability
of such testimony, as well as the "dramatic transformation" which has occurred in
"[c]ourtsf treatments of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification . . . in the
past twenty years" (United States v. Smithers. 212 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2000)), the
decision of the trial court in the case at bar harkened back to two Utah cases decided
almost twenty years ago to support its conclusion that expert testimony was not
admissible. Although State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) (rev'd on other
grounds, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)) and State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert identification testimony
under the circumstances of those cases, both cases were decided prior to the significant
shift and divergent analytical course which emerged in Long. That significant shift and
divergent analytical course require that relevant expert testimony be admitted in cases
where eyewitness identification is a central issue and no other evidence links the
defendant to the crime.
This Court's decisions in Long, Ramirez and Maestas were based on a review of
the "empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identifications [ ]"
(Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 779 (citing Long. 721 P.2d at 488); Maestas. 984 P.2d at 380) and
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a determination that the unreliability of such evidence required an approach which
diverged from prior practice. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. In Long, this Court reviewed the
research regarding human memory and eyewitness identification, recognizing "humanl
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and fallible." Long, 721
P.2d at 488. Although the research shows that eyewitness identifications are often
unreliable, "juries have a fundamental misunderstanding of the reliability of eyewitness
identifications" and "because jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of such
identifications, they often give eyewitness testimony undue weight." Maestas, 984 P.2d at
380 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 490).
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are,
for the most part, unsware of these problems. People simply
do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that
certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory
process of an honest eyewitness. Moreover, the common
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to
documented research findings.
Id.
The increased awareness as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification created by
the studies referenced in Long, as well as the concern that jurors' common beliefs about
the reliability of an identification may actually be contrary to the research findings that led
this Court to reassess its approach to the use of cautionary eyewitness identification
instructions. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Because of the risk that eyewitness testimony would
be given undue weight by uninformed and misguided jurors, this Court concluded "that at
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a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is
warranted" and Mabandon[ed] [the] discretionary approach to cautionary jury instructions,"
instead directing that "trial courts shall give such an instruction whenever eyewitness
identification is a central issue in a case and such instruction is requested by the defense."
Id.; see also Maestas, 984 P.2d at 380-81.
The concerns about the fallibility of eyewitness identification expressed in Utah
case law since the Griffin and Malmrose decisions as well as recent studies regarding the
significant number of wrongful convictions which have been based on faulty eyewitness
identification testimony (see Andrew R. Tillman, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification: The Constitution Says, "Let the Experts Speak," 56 Tenn.L.Rev. 735, 726
(1989); Gary L. wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological
research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol. and the L. 765-791
(1995))see also Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, October 1999) require
that a trial judge take into account this Court's teachings and allow expert testimony
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony in cases where
identification is a central issue. Not only is such evidence "helpful" to a jury, it is
essential to a defendant's ability to present a defense since without such testimony, a jury's
misconceptions rather than relevant evidence could determine the outcome. See,
generally, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (a criminal defendant has the
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right to present a defense).
Utah is not unique in grappling with the transformation in case law which has
occurred as our understanding of this area has increased. In Smithers. the Sixth Circuit
conducted an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of case law in this area and held th^t
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to present expert
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. In reaching that conclusion, the
Smithers court noted that in the 1970's when lawyers began raising this issue, "courts
were uniformly skeptical about admitting such testimony, elaborating a host of reasonjs
why eyewitness experts should not be allowed to testify." Smithers, 212 F.2d at 311. By
the 1980fs, the trend shifted toward allowing the use of eyewitness expert testimony. Id.
(citing inter alia Moore. 786 F.2d at 1313; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232; Smith. 736 F.2d
at 1107; Buell 489 N.E. 2d 795) In fact, "several courts have held that it is an abuse of
discretion to exclude such expert testimony." Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Stevens}
935 F.2d 1380, 1400-01 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith. 736 F.2d at 1107; Downing. 753 F.2d at
1232; Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208) "This jurisprudential trend is not surprising in light of
modern scientific studies which show that, while juries rely heavily on eyewitness
testimony, it can be untrustworthy under certain circumstances." Id.
Since the early 1980fs, a number of decisions have recognized the problems
associated with eyewitness testimony which were acknowledged by this Court in Long,
and have held that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit expert testimony
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in light of those problems. See e.g. Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311; Stevens, 935 F.2d at 140001; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232; Taylor, 749 P.2d at 184-185; McDonald, 690 P.2d at
709; Chappie, 660 P.2d at 1218-23; see also Smith, 736 F.2d at 1103 (expert eyewitness
identification testimony met "helpfulness" requirement and was improperly excluded);
Brooks, 490 N. Y.2d at 702 (expert testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness
identification testimony is admissible). The trial judge abused his discretion is this case,
where identification is the central issue, there is no other evidence other than the
identification testimony linking Appellant to the crimes, Appellant presented an alibi
defense, and the defense sought to have Dr. Dodd testify regarding factors which could
have affected the reliability of the identifications.
First, there is no question that identification is the central issue in this case. Other
than Appellant's alibi, the only defense he had available at trial was the unreliability of the
eyewitness identifications.
Second, there is no other evidence, other than the eyewitness identifications, which
would support Appellant's convictions. The record is entirely devoid of any physical
evidence linking Appellant to the crimes. Appellant's fingerprints were not found in
Gunderson's apartment. (R. 229 at 172) No evidence was presented regarding the gun
used in the commission of these offenses. There was no evidence presented that Appellant
was found in possession of any of the items stolen from Gunderson's apartment. There
was no evidence presented showing that the clothing the eyewitnesses identified their
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assailant wearing belonged to or was found in Appellant's possession. Although someone
reported seeing a suspicious vehicle near Gunderson's apartment on the date in question,
the police failed to follow up on that description in an effort to obtain the identity of the
vehicle's owner. (R. 229 at 173)
Third, the defense sought to present expert testimony which was relevant and
material since it related to the factors which might have affected the reliability of the
identifications in this case. This Court appears to have approved the use of expert
testimony when it noted in State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d at 381, ff[c]ounsel did not present
expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification." As in Maestas,
none of the three identifications in the case at bar are impervious to attack under the
criteria set forth in Long.
Each of the witnesses had an inadequate opportunity to observe the robber: Moss
testified that she was only in the robber's presence for three to five minutes (R. 227 at 47;
R. 229 at 102); that she did not stare at the robber's face because she was afraid that he
would shoot her if he thought that she could point him out, so she tried to avoid him (R.
229 at 102); that she was about eight feet away from the robber when she saw him (R. 229
at 87); and that she was "bawling her eyes out" during the incident. (R. 229 at 93)
Gunderson testified that prior to the robber entering his home, he and his three friends and
been smoking marijuana for three to four hours. (R. 227 at 22-23; R. 229 at 129)
Gunderson testified that after he answered his door, the robber stepped in and shot him in

-23-

the leg. (R. 227 at 7-8; R. 229 at 131-32) Gunderson then lost his balance and fell down
several stairs. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 132) Gunderson testified that after falling, the
robber came down the stairs, picked Gunderson completely off the floor by his hair, and
demanded the drugs, guns, and money hidden in Gunderson's apartment. (R. 227 at 11; R.
229 at 133) Gunderson testified that the robber wore a stocking cap, and that he could
only see from about an inch above the robber's eyebrow and down. (R. 227 at 31) Ayza
Wells, ("Wells") one of Gunderson's friends who had also been smoking marijuana that
night (R. 229 at 120, 124), testified that he was four to four and a half feet away from the
robber when he saw him. (R. 229 at 119) Wells also testified that after looking into the
robber's eyes, he did not look at him again because he did not want to have a confrontation
with the robber. (R. 229 at 119)
The record demonstrates that the identifications are unreliable under the Long
criteria. Moss' statement that she was "bawling her eyes out" (R. 229 at 93) during the
incident indicates that her identification was affected by fright during the incident. That
she avoided the robber, afraid that he may shoot her if he thought she could identify him
(R. 229 at 102) further supports the untrustworthiness of her identification.
Gunderson's condition during the course of the robbery could not have allowed him
to make and record an accurate identification. First, he was under the influence of
marijuana when he first viewed the robber. Second, after being shot, his powers of
observation were hindered not only by the affects of marijuana, but also by his very
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significant physical injury. Third, Gunderson testified that the robber then picked him up
by his hair, implying that Gunderson would have been looking at the floor, if anything, at
this time, rather than the robber's face. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 133)
Wells' eyewitness identification is unreliable under the Long factors as well. Like
Gunderson, he was under the influence of marijuana which would significantly alter his
ability to observe. Further, Well's testimony shows that directly after looking at the
robber's eyes, he refused to look again at the robber, fearing a confrontation. (R. 229 at
119)
Finally, Moss' and Gunderson's identifications of Appellant at the robber were
tainted by a highly suggestive photo array shown to them prior to their in-court
identifications (see Argument at Point II, infra).
As argued supra, however, the Long cautionary instruction given by the Court was
insufficient to properly educate the jurors as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification.
Dr. Dodd's testimony was essential to Appellant's defense, and the trial court's decision
denying Appellant the right to present Dr. Dodd's testimony was an abuse of discretion.
POINT II. INTRODUCTION OF THE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE L SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
State witnesses Moss and Gunderson both identified Appellant as the robber at trial,
after viewing his photo in a photo array in February, 1999. The trial court admitted
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evidence of the photo array identifications at trial and also admitted identifications by
witnesses in court. The admission of this evidence violated Appellant's Due Process
rights under both Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
A. Utah Constitutional Analysis:
The court on appeal reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence of an
eyewitness identification by reviewing the record evidence to determine from the totality
of the circumstances whether the admission of the identifications is consistent with the due
process guarantees of article I, section 7. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah
1991).
In Ramirez, this Court held that "[F]or purposes of determining the due process
reliability of eyewitness identifications under article I, section 7, we will not limit
ourselves to an analytical model that merely copies the federal. We will require an indepth appraisal of the identification's reliability along the lines laid out by Long." 817
P.2d at 780.
Under the Utah constitutional analysis, the ultimate question to be determined is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. State v.
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781)
Appellant submits that the witness1 identifications in the case at bar were unreliable and
admitted at trial in violation of his constitutional rights.
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Under Ramirez, there are five factors to be considered in making this
determination: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the
witness1 degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness' capacity
to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness1 identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or
whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 (citing State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986))
In Ramirez, the defendant was stopped shortly after an aggravated robbery had
occurred. Police handcuffed the defendant to a chain link fence at about 1:00 a.m. Shortly
thereafter, witnesses from a robbery were transported to the arrest scene together. The
police shined the headlights and spotlights from the police cars onto the defendant, and the
witnesses viewed the defendant by looking at him from the back seat of the police car.
The defendant was the only suspect present and was surrounded by police officers. Of the
three witnesses, only one identified the defendant as the robber. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 77577.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress the eyewitness identification. Analyzing the case under the five factors set forth
above, this Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the identification,
although the case was "extremely close." 817 P.2d at 784.
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The case at bar is more than "extremely close." Application of the Ramirez
reliability factors to the facts of this case supports a finding that the eyewitness
identifications were unreliable and should have been suppressed.
1.

The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event.
Both Moss and Gunderson had a limited opportunity to view the assailant during the

events of January 24, 1999. Moss testified at trial that the length of time in which the
robbery took place "couldn't have been more than five minutes . . . I'd say three to five
minutes." (R. 229 at 102) She also testified that she was approximately eight feet away from
the robber when she first saw him.(R. 229 at 87) Moss testified that once the robber saw
her, he told her to lay down on the ground in the kitchen where he duct taped her arms
behind her back. (R. 229 at 88 -89) Moss testified that "When he was there, I didn't get a
really good look at him." (R. 229 at 100) Finally, Moss testified regarding her observation
and identification of the robber that ". . .[T]he whole time I saw him, I only saw him from
the left side. So it made it a little harder." (R. 229 at 112) Moss' testimony demonstrates
that she only had a brief period of time in which to observe the robber and that she
deliberately avoided looking at him.
Although Gunderson may have had a very brief opportunity to view the robber when
he answered the door, the events that transpired directly following the robber gaining
entrance support a finding that Gunderson would have had a very limited time to observe
his assailant. Specifically, Gunderson testified that the robber shot him in the leg after
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Gunderson opened his door. (R. 227 at 7-8; R. 229 at 131-32) Gunderson then lost his
balance and fell down ten to twelve stairs. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 132) Gunderson
testified that the robber then picked him up by his hair, implying that Gunderson would
have been looking at the floor, if anything, at this time, rather than the robber's face. (R.
227 at 11; R. 229 at 133) Gunderson's testimony, coupled with that of Moss' testimony
that the robber was in the apartment for only three to five minutes supports a finding that he
had only a brief period of observation.
2.

The witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event.
Moss and Gunderson's testimony strongly suggests that neither witness could have

paid a high degree of attention to the robber, even if they had truly wanted to. Indeed, the
record shows that Moss was bound by duct tape during most of the robbery, presumably
laying on her stomach. (R. 229 at 88-89) She also testified that she was "bawling her eyes
out,"during the course of the robbery, making it very unlikely that she was directing her
attention to the robber. (R. 229 at 93)
Review of the record also demonstrates a reasonable presumption that Gunderson
was not paying much attention to the robber; particularly after being shot. It is reasonable
to assume that Gunderson was distracted by his gunshot wound as well as by the unusual
activity going on around him.
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3.

The witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity.
This Court in Ramirez set out relevant circumstances to be considered in regard this

factor. Those circumstances are "whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired
by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or
prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. 817 P.2d
at 783.
Applying the factors to the case at bar supports a finding of unreliability. The record
indicates that both Moss and Gunderson suffered from a high degree of stress and fright at
the time of the incident. This Court stated in Long, "[c]ontrary to much accepted lore, when
an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to
decrease significantly." 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) Gunderson's identification was
additionally impaired by a combination of drugs and injury.
Moss was obviously scared during the course of the robbery. She testified that she
did not stare at the robber's face because she was afraid that he would shoot her if he
thought that she could point him out, so she tried to avoid him (R. 229 at 102); and further
that she was "bawling her eyes out" during the robbery. (R. 229 at 93)
Gunderson's condition during the course of the robbery could not have allowed him
to make and record an accurate identification. First, he was under the influence of
marijuana when he first viewed the robber. Second, after being shot, his powers of
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observation were hindered not only by the affects of marijuana, but also by his very
significant physical injury. Third, Gunderson testified that the robber then picked him up
by his hair, implying that Gunderson would have been looking at the floor, if anything, at
this time, rather than the robber's face. (R. 227 at 11; R. 229 at 133)
Gunderson testified at the preliminary hearing that the robbery was "very
traumatizing." (R. 227 at 28) Gunderson testified that he and his three friends and been
smoking marijuana for three to four hours immediately before the robbery. (R. 227 at 2223; R. 229 at 129) When asked just how much marijuana he was smoking that day,
Gunderson answered "Back then I generally smoked a lot on any given day." (R.229 at
140) He testified further that he could not recall specifically how much marijuana that he
had consumed that day, but that it was probably "three to four bowls." (Id.) The
consumption of "a lot" of marijuana on January 24, 1999, as well as his daily consumption
of the substance, undoubtedly compromised seriously Gunderson's mental capacity to
observe.
Gunderson's capacity to observe the robber was also impaired by his physical
condition. Gunderson's bullet wound entered and exited between his knee and ankle on his
left leg, shredding a main artery. (R. 227 at 9) Gunderson testified that "he was in so much
shock from being shot.. ." (R. 229 at 140), and "I was deeply in shock." (R.229 at 141)
After being shot, Gunderson then tumbled down the ten to twelve stairs which led upstairs
to his front door. Gunderson's extremely poor physical condition at the time of the
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robbery had to have hampered his powers of observation.
4.

Whether the witness' identification was made spontaneously and remained
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion.
This Court directs that relevant circumstances to consider under this factor include

"the length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time of the event
and the identification of the defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at
the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions,
identifications, or other information from other sources; instances when the witness or
other eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and
the circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification."
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 783 (citing State v. Long. 721 P.2d at 494 n.8 (Utah 1986).
A review of these circumstances weigh in favor of this Court finding that the
eyewitness identifications in this case were unreliable. Although Gunderson gave a
description of his assailant to the police the same night of the incident, he testified that at
the time he gave the description, he "was either under the influence of drugs [prescribed for
pain] or still very traumatized." (R. 227 at 34) Gunderson described the suspect as a
medium to light skinned African American male, very tall, strong, having facial hair in the
form of a goatee, wearing a baggy, dark coat, a beanie stocking cap that was either black or
dark blue, gloves and carrying a silver or chrome semiautomatic gun. (R. 227 at 29-30, R.
229atl32, 157)
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As argued supra regarding Gunderson's mental state, he had been smoking
marijuana for several hours and was probably still under the influence of marijuana as well.
He also testified, "I was deeply in shock" directly following the shooting. (R.229 at 141)
In addition to being both stoned and shocked simultaneously, Gunderson also seemed to be
fixated on the weapon held by the robber. Gunderson testified, "I was too busy looking at
thegun..." (R.229 at 157).
Finally in relation to Gunderson, the circumstances under which Appellant was
presented to him for identification are not to be depended on. The identification came
some three weeks following the robbery. (R. 228 at 42-43, 45) Merino testified that he put
together a photo array and showed it to Gunderson February 15, 1999. (R. 229 at 164)
Gunderson testified at the preliminary hearing that he had been out of the hospital for five
days to one week by the time Merino showed him the photo array and was still under the
influence of pain killers. (R. 227 at 38-39) At trial, Gunderson testified that he viewed the
photo array 2-3 days after his release from the hospital (229 at 144). Gunderson testified
further that "I was under a lot of pain killers at the time. I mean, I was taking seven or
eight pain killers a day, so my - - for the entire three, three and a half months after I got
shot, it was a complete blur." (Id.)
Moss also gave a description of the suspect to the police the same night as the
robbery, however, like Gunderson, did not make her identification until February 15, 1999.
(R. 227 at 47-48, 228 at 20-21). Moss' description of the robber is inconsistent with
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Gunderson's description, given the same evening. Moss described the robber as wearing a
green and black "Nike" jacket, levi's, a black ski cap, but no gloves. (R. 227 at 49, 229 at
110) Moss also testified that the robber was holding a small, dark blue or black gun in his
hand. (R. 229 at 84). As set forth above, Gunderson stated that the robber had facial hair
and was wearing a dark baggy coat, gloves, and carrying a chrome or silver gun. (R. 227 at
29-30, R. 229 atl32, 157).
Moss's state of mind also indicates that her identification is unreliable. Moss1
statement that she was "bawling her eyes out" (R. 229 at 93) during the incident indicates
that her identification was affected by fright during the incident. That she avoided the
robber, afraid that he may shoot her if he thought she could identify him (R. 229 at 102)
further supports an inference that her ability to observe the robber was hampered by fear.
Moss5 identification was additionally tainted by exposure to outside information
prior to viewing the photo array on February 15, 1999 where she identified Appellant as
the robber. Specifically, Moss testified that she discussed the identification of the robber
with two of her neighbors, Johnny Gordon and Gilbert Ellis, shortly after the incident. (R.
227 at 46 R. 229 at 96-97) She testified that the neighbors gave a description of the robber,
and told her how that he was six feet, nine inches tall, and that they did not know his name,
but that he went by the nickname "Six nine." (Id. at 46-47, R. 229 at 97) Moss then spoke
with Merino, giving him the information conveyed to her by her neighbors. (R. 229 at 98)
Finally, the circumstances under which Appellant was presented to Moss for
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identification are not reliable. Merino conducted the photo array in Gunderson's apartment
parking lot(R. 228 at 14, 229 at 168) Merino showed the photo line up to Gunderson first.
(R. 229 at 168) Moss testified that she stood only ten feet away from Merino and
Gunderson during this time.(R. 229 at 99) Gunderson testified that Moss stood about
twenty feet away (R. 227 at 39), and Merino testified that she stood forty to fifty feet away
while he showed the photos to Gunderson.(R. 228 at 16) Prior to showing Gunderson the
photos, he told both witnesses that the suspect's picture may or may not be in the stack.(R.
228 at 15) Moss testified that she was close enough to the two men while Merino was
showing Gunderson the array to hear Gunderson say, "That's him" and, "I'm 10 on the
scale." (R. 229 at 99)
Moss' firsthand and personal knowledge that Gunderson had picked someone's
picture out of the photo array makes her subsequent identification unreliable. Gunderson's
identification, which Moss overheard, nullifies Merino's statements to her prior to showing
her the photos which warned her that the suspect may or may not be included in the photo
array.2 Gunderson's statements surely pressured her into picking one of the photos from
the stack. Although she testified that "she couldn't see anybody else that even resembled
[the assailant]" (R. 229 at 111) in the stack of photos, she picked one out anyway,
identifying Appellant as the robber.

2

Merino testified at the Motion to Suppress hearing that he "[t]old her [Moss] that he may
or may not be in there" (R. 228 at 20).
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5.

The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would
perceive, remember, and relate it correctly.
Ramirez instructs that relevant factors to be considered under this factor are whether

the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed,
and whether the race of the actor's was the actor's race was the same as the observer's. 817
P.2d at 781. As explained by this Court in Long, the significance of the event to the
witness at the time of perception is important because people usually remember in some
detail where they were when something out of the ordinary occurred, for example, when
John F. Kennedy was assassinated. The Court went on to explain that those same people
are less accurate in their descriptions of events that are not of particular importance at the
time they are observed. 721 P.2d at 488.
In Long, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person by the uncorroborated testimony of one
eyewitness who viewed his attacker while he was crying and his vision was "glossy" for
approximately six seconds during the course of being shot. 721 at 484. The victim did not
identify the defendant in a photo array, but identified him at the preliminary hearing and at
trial Id. In finding that it was improper for the trial court not to have given a cautionary
instruction regarding eyewitness identification testimony, this Court noted that the
circumstances surrounding the victim's identification of the defendant raised "grave
concerns" as to its reliability. Id. Among the Court's concern's in Long was that "these
identifications took place not in formal lineups, but in courtroom proceedings during which

-36-

Long was apparently the only black man present." Id.
Long's facts are similar to the case at bar in that Wells' only identification of
Appellant came at trial, when Appellant was the only black man present in the courtroom.
The trial took place more than a year after the robbery occurred. (R. 229 at 126) The length
of time between the crime and Wells' in-court identification of Appellant suggests that the
identification is untrustworthy. In determining the reliability of Wells' identification, this
Court should also consider that Wells had been smoking marijuana with Gunderson prior to
the incident and therefore was under the influence of drugs (R. 229 at 120. 124), and that
after looking the robber in the eyes, Wells refused to look at him again because he feared a
confrontation (R. 229 at 119). Further, Merino never conducted an in-person lineup in this
case, even though Appellant was in jail and accessible, thus relying only upon his photo
array as a means of identifying the suspect.
Whether the race of the actor's was the same as the observer's is important to the
reliability of an identification because "identifications tend to be more accurate where the
person observing and the one being observed are of the same race." Long, 721 P.2d at 489
(citing Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator
Variables. 36 J. Personality & Social Psych. 1546, 1550 (1978); Note, Cross Racial
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases. 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984); J. Bibicoff, Seeing
is Believing? The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions of the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification Testimony. 11 San Fernando Valley L. Rev. 95 (1983).
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The witnesses in this case identified the robber as a "black man." (R. 228 at 7).
Appellant is an African American. This Court has recognized that identifications tend to be
inaccurate when the witness and the actor are of different races.
The eyewitness identifications in the case at bar are unreliable under the totality of
the circumstances and application of the above Ramirez factors. The trial court violated
Appellant's rights to due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
B:

Federal Constitutional Analysis:
The trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress the Photo Array

Identification and In-Court Identifications violated Appellants federal constitutional rights
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
photo array presented to the witnesses was impermissibly suggestive under the federal due
process clause because the witnesses' attention was improperly focused on Appellant's
photograph.
This Court has said, "[u]nder federal due process, any photo array may be
scrutinized to determine whether it was so impermissibly suggestive that it undermines our
confidence in any subsequent in-court eyewitness identification." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d
1105, 1110-11 (Utah 1994)(citing State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432,435 (Utah 1989). A two
part test is applied in determining whether the photo array was so suggestive that admission
of eyewitness testimony in trial violated defendant's federal due process rights. The first
part of the test requires the court to determine whether the "pretrial photographic
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identification procedure used . . . was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. The second part of the test
dictates that if the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, any in-court identification
"must be based on [an] untainted, independent foundation to be reliable." Id.
The main question under the first part of the test is "whether the photo array
emphasized the defendant's photo over the others." Id. Factors to be considered in this
evaluation are whether the words and body language of the police officer presenting the
array conveyed an attitude of disinterest, whether the officers manipulated the photos to
indicate their belief that one of the photos portrayed the perpetrator, and whether the photos
themselves were selected so that the defendant's stood out from the others. Id.
The record supports a finding that the photo array emphasized Appellant's photo
over the others. Significantly, Merino obtained Appellant's mug shot based on hearsay and
unreliable information obtained from Gunderson regarding the nick name "Six Nine".
Furthermore, Appellant's photo stands out among the others in the array because it is the
only photo resembling the witnesses' description of the suspect. (See Photo Array in
Addendum C)
First, Moss gave Merino hearsay information Moss had obtained from two of her
neighbors. Moss testified that she discussed that she discussed the identification of the
robber with two of her neighbors, Johnny Gordon and Gilbert Ellis, shortly after the
incident. (R. 227 at 46 R. 229 at 96-97) She testified that the neighbors gave a description
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of the robber, and told her how that he was six feet, nine inches tall, and that they did not
know his name, but that he went by the nickname "Six nine". (Id. at 46-47, R. 229 at 97)
Moss then spoke with Merino, telling him the nickname of the suspect given to her by the
neighbors. (R. 229 at 98)
Second, Gunderson also told Merino that he thought the suspect went by the name
"Six Nine," because when he went to answer his door on January 24, 1999, he first asked
who was there. Gunderson said that the reply was "Six Nine." (R. 228 at 9) Gunderson's
descriptions of the suspect are unreliable, for the reasons set forth in Point I, supra.
Based on this information, and thinking that the suspect "was possibly in the Salt
Lake County Jail at that time," Merino called the jail to find out whether they did indeed
have anyone in jail by that nick name. (R. 228 at 9) The jail informed his that they did. (R.
228 at 9) Merino then got a mug shot of the person with the nick name, and this mug shot
turned out to be Appellant's photograph. (R. 228 at 10) Merino testified that he had
specifically picked out Appellant's picture as his suspect because he was a person having
the nick name "Six Nine", according to the Salt Lake County Jail. (R. 228 at 35-36)
Merino then began assembling a photo array, centered around Appellant's photograph (R.
228 at 11), even though he has no formal training in assembling and/or conducting a photo
array.3
3

Merino testified that his employer, the Salt Lake City Police Department has no written
policy advising officers how to conduct a photo line-up, that there is nothing in the Department
in writing which instructs officers what to say to witnesses involved in a photo line-up, and that
he had received no formal training on conducting photo line-ups. (R. 228 at 25-26)
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Merino selected the photos to be included in the array only from a pool of seventyfive photos which he obtained from the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 228 at 12, 39), even
though he had thousands of photos available to him through the Sheriffs Office data bank.
(R. 228 at 38) He testified that he was looking for photos which would be comparable to
Appellant's photograph. (R. 228 at 36) (See Photo Array in Addendum C)
Before Merino obtained Appellant's mug shot from the jail, he obtained descriptions
of the suspect from witnesses Moss and Gunderson which he characterized as "roughly the
same." (R. 228 at 10) The descriptions were different in an important respect, however.
While Gunderson's description of the suspect included a "slight mustache and a goatee,"
(R. 228 at 7) Moss gave no information to Merino regarding facial hair on the suspect,
indicating that she believed the suspect had none. (R. 228 at 32) Additionally, neither
witness gave Merino any specific description of the suspect's face. (R. 228 at 31-32) Other
than Gunderson's description of the suspect's facial hair, Merino's only other information
regarding the description of the suspect's facial characteristics on which to rely was
Gunderson's statement that the suspect was "black" and that his skin tone was "medium".
(R. 228 at 7, 35) With regard to the suspect's other features, Gunderson described him as
very tall, estimating his height to be six feet nine inches and muscular. (R. 228 at 7)
Merino testified that his employer, the Salt Lake City Police Department has no
written policy advising officers how to conduct a photo line-up, that there is nothing in the
Department in writing which instructs officers what to say to witnesses involved in a photo

-41-

line-up, and that he had received no formal training on conducting photo line-ups. (R. 228
at 25-26)
The photos Merino included in the photo array drew the witnesses attention to
Appellant's photo. (See Addendum C) In fact, the witnesses could have picked Appellant's
photo simply by a process of elimination based on the descriptions given to Merino.
Gunderson described the suspect as a medium-complected African American male. (R. 228
at 35) The only person meeting that description in the array is Appellant. Merino himself
agreed that exhibits one, two and five depict African American males with much darker
skin than Appellant. (R. 228 at 37) The witnesses could eliminate three of the photos, then,
right away. Merino also agreed that exhibit number four depicted a very light complected
man who could possibly pass as Hispanic. (R. 228 at 34) The witnesses could then
eliminate a fourth photograph on the basis of ethnicity. Last, Merino seemed to agree that
the person depicted in exhibit five could be identified as looking Tongan or Samoan.4

The

witnesses could then eliminate the fifth photo, leaving only the photo of Appellant to be
identified at the suspect.
The same argument can be made regarding Gunderson's description of the suspect
as having a "slight mustache and a goatee" (R. 228 at 7), and Moss' description of the

testimony regarding exhibit five on Cross Examination on the Motion to Suppress was
as follows:
Q. Could you also identify that person as looking Tongan or Somoan?
A. There is often a description confusion between black and Polynesian.
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suspect of having no facial hair. (R. 228 at 32) Gunderson could have eliminated all of the
photos, except Appellant's, on the basis of their skin tone and on the basis of their facial
hair. None of the five other photos in the array have what could be described as a "slight
mustache." (See Addendum C) Elimination of the five photos of the men with thick beards
or substantial mustaches and goatees left only the Appellant's photo as the suspect.
Finally, the manner in which Merino presented the photo array to the witnesses
support a finding that it was impermissibly suggestive. (See Argument supra at Point
1(A)(4))
The record demonstrates that the photo array as assembled and presented to the
witnesses in this case was impermissibly suggestive. The admission of the photo array
identifications as well as the admission of the witnesses in-court identifications violated
Appellant's federal due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution. The error is reversible, and this case should be remanded for a new trial.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS BY CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE OUTSIDE THE
PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT

Jury selection in this case was held January 18, 2000. Appellant sat with defense
counsel at counsel table. During much of the voir dire process, the trial court conducted
individual voir dire at side bar, off the record, without the Appellant present and without
waiver by the Appellant of his right to be present.(R. 229 at31-50, 62)
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Specifically, the trial court began the voir dire by telling prospective jurors that "the
Court is going to ask some questions, some individually, some collectively. Listen
carefully to the questions. If any question invites an answer, identify yourself by name for
the record and then respond solely to the question that's asked." (R. 229 at 7) The trial
court then proceeded to ask each juror individually questions relating to their employment,
marital status and educational background. (R. 229 at 8-24) The court then asked questions
to the panel "collectively." (R.229 at 24) When the court asked the question, "Are any of
you acquainted more than just casually with anyone who is in law enforcement?", a juror
raised his hand and stated that his daughter's roommate was a Salt Lake County Sheriff and
that he discussed her work with her often.(R. 229 at30-31) The court then asked, "As a
result of those discussions have you formed an attitude or an idea or a philosophy or
anything else that relates to law enforcement?" (R. 229 at 31) The juror answered, "Yes,"
and the trial judge invited him to the bench, where a discussion between the trial judge, the
juror, the prosecutor and the defense attorney was conducted off the record. (Id.) Although
Appellant remained at counsel table during this discussion and those which followed, there
is no indication in the record that he freely and voluntarily waived his right to presence.
The trial judge conducted a total of 10 such discussions with nine different prospective
jurors (one juror approached the bench twice) during voir dire. (R. 229 at 31-32, 35, 40, 4142, 44-45, 50) Though off the record, each question solicited an answer which related to
that juror's bias. (Id.) The questions asked immediately prior to each side-bar conference
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indicate that the discussions focused on whether individual jurors' would be able to remain
objective despite their relationships with people who work in law enforcement (R. 229 at
31-32, 35), personal experiences of arrest or relationships with immediate family members
who had been arrested (R. 229 at 40-42), and personal experience as a victim of crime and
relationships with immediate family members who had been a victim of a crime. (R. 229 at
43-45, 50) The trial judge openly invited anyone who wanted, to discuss matters
"personally with the Court at the bench or do you want to discuss it on the record?" (R. 229
at 39-40)
A defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to be present at all stages of the
trial. Utah Const, art I, section 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1953); See also, State of Utah
v. Houtz. 714
P.2d 677 (Utah 1986). This Court has stated that the defendant may waive his or her
constitutional
right to presence only if the waiver is voluntary. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. Further,
voluntariness of
defendant's waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. Id- In State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d
990, 992 (Utah 1982) this Court acknowledged that a defendant's "right to be present is
conceded and guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States." This Court also noted that a defendant's right to presence is not
absolute, but may be waived by word or act of the person claiming the right. Id.
In Houtz, the defendant's trial was scheduled to start February 26, 1985. The
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defendant failed to appear and the court continued the trial until the next morning. The
defendant did not appear the next morning and the prosecutor advised the court that the
defendant was in custody in a different state. The trial court denied defense counsel's
request for another continuance, saying that the defendant had voluntarily chosen to absent
himself from the trial. The trial proceeded without the defendant and he was convicted.
This Court reversed and remanded the case noting that the trial court had abused its
discretion in not continuing the trial until the defendant could be present.
While there is no case law in Utah bearing directly on the issue of whether side-bar
voir dire, conducted outside the presence of the defendant violated his statutory and
constitutional rights, courts in New York, North Carolina and West Virginia have ruled on
nearly identical issues.
In State v. Antommarchi. 604 N.E.2d 95 (Court of Appeals of New York, 1992) the
trial judge invited prospective jurors to the bench during voir dire to speak about issues
they did not want to discuss publicly. These discussions were held on the record, with
counsel, but outside the presence of the defendant. The defendant appealed his conviction,
arguing that the trial court violated his right to be present during a material part of the trial
when it allowed potential jurors to approach the bench and discuss voir dire questions
outside the presence of the defendant. The Court of Appeals of New York agreed, and
reversed Antommarchi's conviction. The Court noted that "[a] court may conduct side-bar
discussions with prospective jurors in a defendant's absence if the questions relate to juror
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qualifications such as physical impairments, family obligations and work commitments, "
604 N. E. 2d at 97. The court held, however, that a trial court may not "explore
prospective jurors' backgrounds and their ability to weigh the evidence objectively unless
defendant is present." Id. The Court found further that defendant's failure to object to his
exclusion from the side-bar conferences was not fatal to his claim on appeal because of his
statutorily guaranteed "fundamental right to be present." Id.
In State of North Carolina v. Johnston. 417 S. E. 2d 228 (North Carolina, 1991), codefendants were convicted of first degree murder. One defendant was sentenced to death
and the other was sentenced to life imprisonment. Among other issues argued on appeal,
the defendants argued that the trial court erred in conducting private bench discussions with
prospective jurors in the absence of the defendants, their attorneys and a court reporter.
The Court agreed, holding that the confrontation clause of the Constitution of North
Carolina guaranteed the defendants' right to presence at every stage of the trial. 417 S. E.
2d at 232. The Court also said that because the record did not include the substance of the
private discussions, "we are unable to engage in the proper analysis to determine whether
the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we must conclude that the
State has failed to carry its burden, and we cannot say that the trial court's errors were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 417 S. E. 2d at 232-233.
In State of West Virginia v. Hamilton. 403 S. E. 2d 739 (Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia, 1991), the defendant appealed his conviction arguing among other issues
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that the trial court erred by conducting jury selection in his complete absence and without
his waiver of his right to be present. The Court held that a defendant indicted for a felony
has a statutory and Constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of a criminal
proceeding. 403 S. E. 2d at 740-42) The Court also held that Rule 43(a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure guaranteed a defendant's right to presence. 403 S. E.
2d at 742.
In its discussion of the case, the Hamilton Court noted that when a defendant is
absent from a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, the Constitution requires the State "to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless." Id.
Citing State v. Bovd. 233 S. E. 2d 710, 719 (W. Va. 1977) The Court also noted that the
lack of a record indicating what transpired during the absence of the defendant creates a
possibility of prejudice, rendering "it impossible for the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless." Id. The State argued on appeal
that the defendant's failure to object to the issue of his right to presence until the appellate
stage constituted a waiver of such right. 403 S. E. 2d at 743. The Court rejected the State's
argument, stating that although waiver by the defendant of his fundamental and
constitutional right to be present at every stage of the proceedings could be accomplished, it
must be achieved "by the defendant himself in the form of a knowing and intelligent
waiver." Id. The Court found no such waiver and stated that a defendant's right to presence
"is constitutional in nature and fundamental to the defendant's right to a fair trial. It cannot
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be waived by someone other than the defendant and cannot be considered waived by failure
to raise the issue until the appellate stage." Id.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has also addressed the issue of a defendant's right to
be present at every stage of a criminal proceeding. In Arizona v. McCrimmon, 927 P.2d
1298, (Arizona, 1996) The Court reversed the two defendants' convictions and remanded
on other grounds. Although they did not reach the defendants' specific right to presence
issue, the Court issued a "Cautionary Note Concerning Proceedings in the Absence of
Defendants in Criminal Cases," 927 P.2d at 1300. The Court warned trial courts and
counsel "that proceedings in criminal cases held outside the defendant's presence are
fraught with danger and should be conducted, if at all, only for valid reasons and only
where the record clearly shows that the defendant waived his right to be present." Id.
Defense counsel failed to object to the trial court's conduct on voir dire. Although
this issue was not raised before the trial court, this Court should consider this issue on
appeal because Appellant did not voluntarily waive his right to presence. See State v.
Glenny, 656 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982) Furthermore, a defendant's right to presence "is
constitutional in nature and fundamental to the defendant's right to a fair trial. It cannot be
waived by someone other than the defendant and cannot be considered waived by failure to
raise the issue until the appellate stage."
State of West Virginia v. Hamilton, 403 S. E. 2d 739, 743 (W. Va., 1991)
This Court may also this issue on appeal because the trial court committed plain
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error. State v. Harrison.

P.2d

(slip opinion at paragraph 15) (Utah 2001). See

also State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Appellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);
State v. Deli. 861 P.2d431 (Utah 1993).
This Court has set forth a two-step test for application of the plain error doctrine on
appeal. See State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336; State v. Eldridge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).
First, the error must be "plain," meaning that "from our examination of the record, we must
be able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error."
Braun 787 P.2d at 1341 (citing Eldridge. 773 P.2d at 35). Second, the error must affect the
"substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful." Id. The policy underlying
the plain error rule is to allow the court to reach justice in any given case and avoid
injustice. Braun, 787 P.2d at 1341-42).
The Court of Appeals noted in Braun. "that the two plain error requirements of
obviousness and harmfulness are related and that the obviousness requirement poses no
rigid and insurmountable barrier to review. For example, the more harmful an error is, the
more likely an appellate court is to conclude that it was objectively obvious," 787 P.2d at
1342. Appellant submits that the trial court's error in conducting individual voir dire and
side bar and off the record was both obvious and harmful making this issue proper for
judicial review.

-50-

CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Appellant's pre-trial
motions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification and
regarding suppression of the photo array identifications and in-court identifications of
defendant. The trial court also erred in engaging in conversations with prospective jurors at
the bench, outside the presence of the Appellant, when Appellant did not waive his right to
be present. Appellant respectfully asks this court to reverse his convictions and remand for
a new trial.
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Amend. XTV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
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pointment.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec* 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence agsdnst himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
f iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record-involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).

77-1-6. Rights of defendant,
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
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(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]

Hon; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to h?ve "mnuSo^

Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

RULING

:

CASE NO. 991903649

:

DARRYL HUBBARD,

:

Defendant.

:

Defendant's Motion to Allow Eyewitness Expert Testimony came
before the Court for hearing on September 22, 1999.

John K.

Johnson, Deputy District Attorney, appeared for the State, and
Stephanie Ames, Salt Lake Legal Defenders, appeared for defendant.
The Court, having reviewed the Memorandum submitted by the parties,
having

heard

arguments

of

counsel,

and

also

having

allowed

additional time for briefing after the hearing, and now being fully
advised, rules as follows:
Defendant's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony regarding the
issue

of

eyewitness

identification

is

DENIED.

Defendant

appropriately argues that there are some problems inherent in
eyewitness testimony, which view is fully supported by the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah

STATE V. HUBBARD
1986) .
could
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In Long, however, the court determined that the problems
be

addressed

instruction.

through

an

appropriately

crafted

jury

Subsequent to Long/ Utah courts have routinely given

an instruction based upon Long when requested by the defendant.
The defendant points to the decision in State v. Maestas, 367
Utah Adv.Rep. 15 (Utah, April 9, L999) , in support of the argument
that the Court should allow expert testimony, in addition to a
cautionary instruction.

The Maestas case was decided on the issue

of ineffective assistance of counsel.

It is true that the court

mentioned that "Counsel did not present expert testimony regarding
the unreliability of eyewitness identification."

Id. at 18. This

statement alone, however, which was not part of the holding of the
court, does not require this Court to allow expert testimony. The
only holding expressly

stated by the Maestas court was that

"counsel's failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction
rendered his performance constitutionally deficient."

Id. at 19.

While the Maestas decision, and the arguments of counsel,
both alert the Court to the possibility of allowing eyewitness
testimony, this Court does not believe that such testimony is
either

required

or

advisable.

First,

the

more

complete

consideration of the issues in both Long and subsequent cases
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suggest to this Court that education of the jury is a judicial
function, best accomplished through instruction, rather than one to
be delegated to an expert who would, in fact, merely lecture the
jury.

Second, the Court is concerned that allowing an expert

witness on the subject of reliability of eyewitness testimony would
have a significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role
as fact finder, at least with respect to any issues that must be
decided based on eyewitness testimony.
For the foregoing reasons, as earlier stated, the Motion is
denied.

This signed ruling shall be the Order of the Court, and no

further Order is required.
Dated this

J2ft Iday of September, 1999.

ROBERT K. HILDER
DISTRICT COURT JUU

I3H
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this
1999:

John K. Johnson
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Stephanie Ames
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

day of September,
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JANET M. MILLER-6410
STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY - 2149
Attorney for Defendant
10 West Broadway, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6474
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
VERIFICATION OF PHOTO
ARRAY EXHIBIT

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 20000233SC
Lower Court No. 991903649 FS

DARRYL HUBBARD,
Defendant.

The undersigned, Detective Carl G. Merino, Salt Lake City Police Department, was
assigned to work on the above-entitled case. During the course of the investigation
Detective Merino showed the attached photographic array labeled Exhibit(s)/~ &
robbery eyewitnesses. The same exhibit was introduced into evidence at trial.
DATED this

13

day of March, 2001,

CARX G\ MERINO
Detective Salt Lake City Police
STATE OF UTAH
County of Sa*t Lake

)
:ss
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO beforej M
me
ic this
ii no l' 3^
f" "^XT™ ™" """Notary Public
I
KCTUBAMAWMTT .
^ ^
KETURAMA^VITT
10WtttBiMdwSuJi«0 1i

I

SaHUto City, Utah 14101
MyCommiMionExpifW
^0*05*17.2004

My Commission Expires:

.
I

day
u a y of
ui March,
men ui i, 2001.
*-\jy i.

NdTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

to the

EXHIBIT 1

SHERIFF
RPVHOND
«**»-.

COLEHfiN
Booking**
SO. #:
Height
Weight;
Sex:
Race
)B
Uate

9410077
0181444
510
140
NflLE
MALE
BLfiCK
0
077 // 3300// 69
60394

EXHIBIT 2

H Hi
HliL^fWFil
mtfGjmm\
^?
JEFFERV
PDDTCD
rUK1hK
Bookmg#: 9829739
5.0. #:
0151597
Height:
607
Weight:
220
Sex:
HfiLE
Race:
BLfiCK
DOB:
01 / 0 7 / 68
Date
122498

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 4

isgiUSUI
V
WILBERT
BRVRNT
Bookmg#
SO. #:
Height:
Ueight
Sex:
R-^ce:
R:

9524204
0188792
600
250
HfiLE
BLRCK

0 5 / 2 9 / 62
;11695

w

EXHIBIT 5

DRNNV

mz9 f w

PORKER
Booking* 9602657
SO. #:
0204759
Height: 602
Weight
300
Sex
HOLE
Race
BLRCK
DOB
12 / 15 / 76
Date
20396
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EXHIBIT 6

